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I~ ~rHE

SUPREME COURT
OF '"fHE

STATE OF UTAH
TH()~L\S
L()l~ISE

G. HURST and
\ 1. HURST, his wife
-vs-

Plaintiffs.

THE s·r.\TE OF UTAH, operating
by and through the Department
of Higlnvays, and ROBERT B.
BURGRAFF CONSTRUCTION
CO~IP.\0JY,

Case No. 10,089

Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE~IENT

OF NATURE OF CASE

Plaintiffs allege in their complaint two causes of action:
( 1) That Defendant State of Utah owns a gravel pit next
door to plaintiffs' home and that said gravel pit is operated
by Defendant Burgraff Construction Company; that the
use of the gravel pit is damaging plaintiffs' property and
that defendants should be restrained from using the gravel
pit. (2) That defendant's operation has been willful and
negligent, and unskilled, and creates a nuisance. Therefore, plaintiffs ask for compensatory damage of $25,000.00
and punitive damage of $25,000.00.
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT
Defendant State of Utah made a Motion to Dismiss
plaintiffs, complaint on the grounds that the court did not
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2
have jurisdiction over the Defendant State of Utah, the
State being immune from this type of action and had not
consented to be sued. The Defendant, Robert B. Burgraff
Construction Company moved to dismiss and in the alternative to strike the part of plaintiff's complaint dealing with
punitive damages. The District Court granted Defendant
State of Utah its Motion to Dismiss as to the State, and
denied Defendant Burgraff Construction Company's Motion to Dismiss as to it, but granted its Motion to Strike the
provision as to punitive damages. The Defendant Robert
Burgraff Construction Company filed its Answer. Plaintiffs
brought this appear from the Lower Court's Order dismissing the complaint against the State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek to have the Lower Court's Order dismissing the complaint against the State of Utah reversed
and the State of Utah re-instated as a party defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Respondent agrees with the first two paragraphs of
plaintiffs' Statement of Facts and can amplify them somewhat.
The gravel pit has been owned by the State since 1959,
and consists of approximately 48 acres. This pit is situated
near several other gravel pits, and has been in fairly constant use since it was acquired. The State does not operate
the property, but merely makes it available to contractors
for their use in the construction of highways.
The Robert Burgraff Construction Company has removed approximately 106,000 cubic yards of material from
this site as of September, 1963.
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3
The area is zoned by city ordinance as a residential area,
but stipulates that sand, clay or gravel may be removed.
Respondent does not know about the facts stated in the
third paragraph of appellants' Statement of Facts, but for
the purposes of this appeal assumes them to be so.
As to the fourth paragraph, the State does contemplate
the continued lawful use of its property for the purposes for
\vhich it was acquired; but does not attempt to draw the
legal conclusion that said operation is a nuisance as felt by
appellants in their brief, but not alleged by appellants in
their complaint.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY HAS
~0 JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE OF UTAH.

Section 27-12-9, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, reads as
follows:
"By its name the commission may sue, and it may be sued only on

\vritten contracts made by it or under its authority."

It is a \veil recognized rule that the State is immune from
suit for damages without legislative consent. See Wilkinson
:·.State, 42 Ut. 483, 134 Pac. 626 ( 1913) ; State vs. Fourth
District Court, 94 Ut. 384, 98 P.2d 502 ( 1937); Campbell
Building Co. vs. State Road Commission, 95 Ut. 242, 70
P.2d 853 ( 1937) ; Bingham v. Board of Education, 118 Ut.
582, 232 P.2d 432; Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Ut. 324,
241 P.2d 907 ( 1952) ; State vs. Tedesco, 4 Ut. 2d 31, 286
P.2d 15 ( 1955); ]opes vs. Salt Lake County, 9 Ut. 2d 297,
2-!3 P.2d 728 ( 1959); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton,
10 l.Jt. 2d 100, 349 P.2d 157 ( 1960); Fairclough vs. Salt
Lake County, et al, 10 Ut. 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 ( 1960);
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

State Road Commission vs. joseph A. Parker, et al, 368

P.2d 585 ( 1962).
This doctrine was also apparently recognized by the
appellants in this action in that they indicate that they have
dismissed their claim, or cause of action, wherein they were
asking for damages against the State of Utah, leaving their
prayer as they state for relief restricted to injunction. This
contention will be argued later.
It is also fairly well settled that the State cannot be enjoined by the courts for consequential damages. This theory
was set forth particularly in the case of State vs. Fourth District Court, supra, in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the State Road Commission from constructing a viaduct
until plaintiff was compensated for damages, because of the
interference, or alleged interference, with air, light and
view, and access. The court held:
"The State Road Commission is an agency of the State ... Being an
unincorporated agency of the State, a suit against it is a suit against
the State. The State cannot be sued unless it has given its consent
or waived its immunity. Defendants do not argue in their briefs
that consent has been given by the State, or that there has been
any waiver of the State's immunity from suit. Their argument is
that the injunction suit is not against the State. We cannot agree
with this argument insofar as the Road Commission as such is concerned. It is an agency of the State, and a suit against it is a suit
against the State."

Much of what was said in the Fourth District Court
case, supra, has been reversed in later decisions. See H jorth
v. Whittenburg and Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton,
supra, but the pronouncement of the court regarding immunity of the State from an injunction proceeding, in regard to this type of action, has not been reversed and stands
as a clear statement of the rule in this jurisdiction.
Justice Wolfe amplified the rule when he stated that:
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.. ~t'ithcr the Road Commission nor the individual Commissioners
could be restrained from inflicting consequential damages."
( Hjorth v. Whittenburg, supra).

The rule about injunctions against consequential damages, set forth in the Fourth District Court case, was recently affirmed in the case of the Springville Banking Co.
vs. Burton, supra, wherein the plaintiff attempted by mandamus to require members of the Road Commission to
compensate alleged damages resulting from highway consttuction. Our Court stated:
( 1) "Can plaintiff, employing the extraordinary writ of mandamus, compel the state or pay damages when because of sovereign immunity, it could not have done so in a direct suit
against the State or the Road Commission?
"We believe and hold that the procedure chosen by Plaintiff
was an effort indirectly to do that which repeatedly we have
held could not be done directly, which is dispositive of this
case on that ground." (Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton,
supra).

l\Iandamus in this case was referred to as an injunctive proceeding.
The appellants in the present action claim that these
cases are not applicable to the present situation in that this
is not a suit for consequential damages, but is a suit to enjoin a nuisance. It is the respondent's contention that this
is just another attempt by appellants to try to do indirectly
\vhat this court has held continually could not be done
directly. There is no question but what the State can be
enjoined in regard to a direct taking when they take a piece
of property without compensation. To allow a party to
bring an action for an injunction in the circumstances in the
present case, is to allow a party to bring an action for a consequential damage for the facts alleged by appellants are
not such that \vould indicate anything but a consequential
damage.
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How do you distinguish between nuisance and a consequential damage? What definitive terms can be utilized
to distinguish between a damage to property, when no part
thereof is taken, or a damage to property by reason of an
alleged nuisance? This court, in the case of Springville
Banking Co. vs. Burton, supra, in answer to one of the questions, propounded to itself in regard to this case, wherein
the Road Commission placed a concrete island in the middle of the main street eliminating "U" turns and "left"
turns to plaintiff's property, the following question:
(2) "Was the damage here compensable in any event? ... As to
( 2) : In this era of the freeway, citizens must yield to the
common weal, albeit injury to their property may result.
We espouse the notion that if the sovereign exercises its
police power reasonably and for the good of all the people,
when constructing highways, consequential damages such
as those alleged here, are not compensable. On the other
hand, if public officials act arbitrarily and unreasonably,
causing, for example, total destruction of the means to get
in and out of one's property, without any reasonable justification for doing so in the public interest, in a manner that
imposes a special burden on one not shared by the public
generally, principles of equity no doubt could be invoked to
prevent threatened action of such character or to remove
any instrumentality born of such conduct. Plaintiff did not
allege or assert anything akin thereto."

Justice Henroid in his answer to Justice Wade's dissent,
in regard to the Springville Banking Co. vs. Burton case,
concludes by the statement:
"The United States, since its creation, and the State of Utah, ever
since its creation, have never permitted the government to be sued
without its consent. This is true whether property is taken for a
public use without just compensation or whether the governm~nt
decides to renege on a contract or obligation. Sovereign immunity
is so ingrained in our system of jurisprudence that no case can be
found where the government of the United States or the State of
Utah was allowed to be sued by implied consent or otherwise for a
taking or damaging of property for public use without compensa-
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tion. There is no distinction in principle as it related to the United
Stltes or the State of Utah."

The question then presents itself- is the type of damage, as alleged in the present action, that which indicates
public official acts which are arbitrary and unreasonable,
and '"ithout any reasonable justification in the public interest, imposed in a manner that creates a special burden on
one not shared by the public generally, which would allow
a court of equity to invoke its jurisdiction to prevent this
type of action?
In the case of Shaw v. Salt Lake County, 119 Ut. 50,
224 P.2d 1037 ( 1950), the court evidently found the type
of action that it felt was within this category, and held that
it \vas a nuisance and subject to injunction. It is the respondent's contention that this case is not compelling upon
the present case and is distinguishable from the instant situation( 1) The Shaw case was against the county and not
against the state, and the court carefully confined its decision to situations involving municipalities. Not a single case
is cited or argued in the decision regarding the State or its
.
agencies.
(2) In the Shaw case the offensive use feared by reason
of the gravel pit '''as the use to be made by the county and
not a third party, and the only relief available was against
the county. In the instant situation, the Highway Department has simply obtained the gravel location and made it
available to the contractor, and it is the contractor, as an
independent contractor, who is actually using the site and
committing the alleged offensive acts of which the plaintiffs complain. The appellants have an ~dequate legal
remedy. and as such do not have the compelling necessity
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for an injunctive-type proceeding. If Defendant Burgraff
Construction Company is committing the acts, as alleged
by the plaintiffs, such that the contractor is negligent or unskillful in the operation of the gravel pit, they have an adequate legal remedy against the contractor (43 Am. Jur. par.
83, p. 827), and it is apparent that the court has taken this
into consideration in that the court did not grant the Defendant Burgraff Construction Company's Motion to Dismiss. And, at the present time the Defendant Burgraff Construction Company has answered.
( 3) The Shaw case was an aggravated situation where
there were 87 owners in a highly developed residential area,
and where there was no apparent adequate remedy at law.
In the instant situation only a handful of owners live near
this gravel operation, which has been operating for many,
many years and only the plaintiffs complain. The fact situation between the Shaw case and the instant situation is not
at all comparable.
We are then faced with the problem of what is it exactly
that the appellants are asking for? What relief do they want
in their action? A careful analysis of their complaint indicates that they have two causes of action stated:
( 1) Based upon the defendants' utilization of the property as a gravel pit; the fact that they are using it for mining
and excavating; the fact they create noise; the fact that
they utilize it early in the morning and late at night; the
fact that great amounts of smoke and dust are generated
and that the wind can convey it upon the plaintiffs' property, and they claim that the stockpiling of materials is located close to the plaintiffs' property and as such the wind
can blow dust and debris upon the plaintiffs' property. In
this regard they claim that this type of action damages them
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to the extent that they need an order restraining the defendants from the usc of their property as a gravel pit. It appears they base this request for the injunction totally upon
the dan1ages that results to them from the operation of the
gravel pit.
(2) In the second cause of action they rely upon the fact
that the operations of the defendants have been willful and
negligent, when the defendants were informed and notified
of the objections of the plaintiffs', and that the acts and conduct of the defendants in the management of said property
has been in such a negligent and unskillful manner as to
constitute a nuisance injurious to the health, comfort and
safety of the plaintiffs and the enjoyment of their premises.
And, in that regard the plaintiffs ask for compensatory
damages in the amount of $25,000.00 and ask for punitive
damages in the amount of $25,000.00.
Now, in their brief, appellants realizing that they cannot
sue the State for damages have dismissed their claim for
damages against the State of Utah leaving their prayer for
relief restricted to injunction. Nowhere in their cause of
action, "·herein they ask for an injunction, do they mention the "·ord nuisance. The only relief or claim they have
for their complaint is that of damages. And, in the cause
of action, "·herein they claim a nuisance, nowhere do they
ask for an injunction. The only claim for relief that they
put forth is for a monetary damage.
:\.ppellants admit that the State of Utah is not an active
partner in the operation of this gravel pit. They admit that
the State is merely the O\vner and that it lets the premises
out to its contractors for use in the building of highways.
Xo,..~here in the First Cause of Action do they state that the
Defendant State of Utah is acting arbitrarily or unreason-
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ably, nor do they state that it is acting without any reasonable justification for its acts.
Nuisance as defined in 39 Am. Jur. par. 2, p. 280, states:
"The nuisance doctrine operates as a restriction upon the right of
an owner of property to make such use of it as he pleases. In legal
phraseology the term 'nuisance' is applied to that class of wrongs
which arises from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful
use by a person of his own property and produces such material
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or hurt that the law will
presume a consequent damage."

Nowhere in the present situation is there any allegation
that the State of Utah in utilizing its property is acting unreasonably, unwarrantably or unlawfully. Only in their
second cause of action, wherein the plaintiffs ask for compensatory and punitive damages, do the appellants allege
that the action of the defendants is negligent and unskillful
and that the operation is willfully negligent, and in this case
it is hard to see where or why the State of Utah, acting in
the capacity of a nominal landlord, could possibly be connected with the management of the property and could be
held for any negligent or unskillful manner that would
create the nuisance complained of by the plaintiffs herein.
It is solely because of these allegations of the negligent
and unskillful operation of the gravel pit by the Defendant
Burgraff Construction Company that allows the court to
retain jurisdiction of the Defendant Construction Company. If such action is negligent or unskillful, then the contractor does not participate in the sovereign immunity of
the State. The subject is discussed in 43 Am. Jur., par. 83,
p. 827, wherein it states:
" . . . injuries necessarily incident to performance of contract;
nuisances ... as a general rule, a private contractor in the construction of a public improvement under a contract wi~h duly
authorized public authorities is not liable for any injury, d1rect or
consequential, to owners of private property that may result as a
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necessary incident from the prosecution of the work in a proper
lll.tnner, which would otherwise amount to a nuisance. The theory
is th;tt one who contract with a public body for the performance of
public work is entitled to share the immunity of the public body
from liability for incidental injuries necessarily involved in the
prcformance of the contract, where he is not guilty of negligence.
In other words, when the act or failure to act which causes an
injury is one which the contractor was employed to do, the injury
n~sults not from a negligent manner of doing the work, but from
the performance thereof, the contractor is entitled to share the immunity from liability which the public enjoys, but he is not entitled
to the immunity of the public from liability where the injury arises
from thl' negligent manner of performing the work. Under an
agreement on his part to be responsible for any damage or injury
resulting from the performance of the work he may not be held
liable for results which follow from a performance of the terms
of the contract."

It is, therefore, the contention of the Respondent that
there is nothing in the complaint that would give to the
court jurisdiction. The court acted correctly in dismissing
this action against the Defendant, State of Utah.

CONCLUSION
Unless appellants allege such facts to show such arbitrary and unreasonable causing of damage without reasonable justification for doing so in the public interest, in a
manner that imposes a special burden on one not shared by
the public generally, principles of equity cannot be involved
and prevent threatened action of such character or to remove any instrumentality born of such conduct. (Spring~·ille Banking Co. l'. Burton, supra) .
.\ppellants did not allege or assert anything akin thereto
that \\·ould take this action from without the general rule
that a consequential damage cannot be enjoined.
Further appellants' allegation that they are without
legal remedy at Ia\\·, is not substantiated by their complaint
and they in fact allege that they have a legal remedy at la:
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against Defendant Burgraff Construction Company in their
Second Cause of Action, and having an adequate remedy
at law appellants are not entitled to an injunction. (Shaw
vs. Salt Lake County, supra). The District Court must have
taken these allegations into consideration in not dismissing
the complaint against the Defendant Burgraff Construction
Company, thereby allowing plaintiffs to pursue their legal
remedy for damages.
Therefore, the Court acted correctly in dismissing this
action against the Defendant State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General

JOSEPHS. KNOWLTON
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondents
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